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Abstract. Formal verification is still rarely applied to the IoT (Internet of Things)
software, whereas IoT applications tend to become increasingly popular and crit-
ical. This short paper promotes the usage of formal verification to ensure safety
and security of software in this domain. We present a successful case study on
deductive verification of a memory allocation module of Contiki, a popular open-
source operating system for IoT. We present the target module, describe how the
code has been specified and proven using Frama-C, a software analysis platform
for C code, and discuss lessons learned.
Keywords: deductive verification, specification, FRAMA-C, Contiki, memory al-
location.
1 Introduction
While formal verification is traditionally applied to embedded software in many critical
domains (avionics, energy, rail, etc.), its usage for the Internet of Things (IoT) has not
yet become common practice, probably because the first IoT applications were not con-
sidered as critical. However, with the emergence of the Internet of Things, embedded
devices get massively connected to the Internet. In this context, security concerns be-
come of utmost importance as IoT applications today often deal with sensitive data and
act on the physical world. The devices are both constrained and network-facing, thus
creating new opportunities for attackers and new challenges for verification. One of
these challenges is to verify an embedded yet full-fledged low-power IPv6 stack under-
lying many potentially critical IoT applications. In this paper we focus on the Contiki
OS [3], and in particular on its memory allocation module memb providing a generic
mechanism for allocation of a bounded number of blocks of any given type.
Contributions. This experience report paper advocates the use of formal verification
for IoT and presents a case study on verification of the memb module performed with
FRAMA-C [4], a rich and powerful toolset for analysis of C code. We formally specify
memb operations and prove it using the deductive verification tool FRAMA-C/WP. We
emphasize two specific issues: the generic nature of the module (resulting in heavier
pointer arithmetics and casts) and the need to specify the number of available blocks
(requiring an axiomatic definition of occurrence counting). Finally, we describe the
verification results and discuss lessons learned.
22 Contiki and its Memory Allocation Module
Contiki and Formal Verification. Today’s IoT software is highly critical because it
runs on hardware that is able to sense or even act on physical things. A compromised
IoT device may get access to sensitive or private data. Worse, it might become able
to take action on the physical world, potentially with safety consequences. Examples
of such include reconfiguring an industrial automation process, interfering with alarms
or locks in a building, or in the e-health domain, altering a pacemaker or other vital
devices.
Contiki is an Operating System for the Internet of Things. It was among the pioneers
in advocating IP in the low-power wireless world. In particular, it features a 6LoWPAN
stack [5], that is, a compressed IPv6 stack for IEEE 802.15.4 communication. This
enables constrained devices to interoperate and connect directly to the Internet. Sensors,
actuators or consumer devices can be brought together and create applications in various
areas such as home automation or the smart grid.
Contiki is targeted at constrained devices with a 8, 16 or 32-bit MCU and no MMU.
The devices usually feature a low-power radio module, some sensors, a few kB RAM
and tens of kB ROM. Contiki has a kernel, written in portable C, that is linked to
platform-specific drivers at compile-time. At the time of writing, it supports 36 dif-
ferent hardware platforms.
When Contiki started in 2003, the focus was on enabling communication in the
most constrained devices, with no particular attention given to security. As it matured
and as commercial applications arose, communication security was added at different
layers, via standard protocols such as IPsec or DTLS. The security of the software itself,
however, did not receive much attention. Although a continuous integration system is
in place, it does not include formal verification. While formal verification has already
been applied to microkernels and Cloud hypervisors (see [2, Sec. 5] for related work),
we are not aware of similar verification projects for IoT software.
Contiki’s memb Module. In this case study, we turn our attention to Contiki’s main
memory management module: memb. To avoid fragmentation in long-lasting systems,
Contiki does not use dynamic allocation. Memory is pre-allocated in blocks on a per-
feature basis, and the membmodule helps the management of such blocks. For instance,
the routing module provisions forN entries, which are stored in a static memory areaN
times the size of a routing entry. Entries are managed by allocating and freeing blocks
at runtime.
The module memb offers a simple API, enabling to initialize a memb store, allocate
a block, free a block, check if a pointer refers to a block inside the store and count the
number of allocated blocks. memb consists in about 100 lines of code but is one of the
most critical elements of Contiki, as the kernel and many modules rely on it. A flaw in
memb could result in attackers reading or writing arbitrary memory regions, crashing
the device, or triggering code execution.
The Contiki code base involves a total of 56 instances of memb. Not all are included
in a given Contiki firmware, but a subset is included depending on the application and
configuration. memb is used for instance for HTTP, CoAP (lightweight HTTP), IPv6
routes, CSMA, the MAC protocol TSCH, packet queues, network neighbors, the file
system Coffee or the DBMS Antelope.
31 /* file memb.h */
2 struct memb {
3 unsigned short size; // block size
4 unsigned short num; // number of blocks
5 char *count; // block statuses
6 void *mem; // array of blocks
7 };
8 #define MEMB(name, btype, num)...
9 // macro used to decrare a memb store for
10 // allocation of num blocks of type btype
11
12 void memb_init(struct memb *m);
13 void *memb_alloc(struct memb *m);
14 char memb_free(struct memb *m, void *p);
15 ...
1 /* file demo.c */
2 #include "memb.h"
3 struct point {int x; int y};
4
5 // before preprocessing,
6 // there was the following macro:
7 // MEMB(pblock, struct point, 2);
8
9 // after preprocessing, it becomes:
10 static char pblock_count[2];
11 static struct point pblock_mem[2];
12 struct struct memb pblock = {
13 sizeof(struct point), 2,
14 pblock_count, pblock_mem };
15 ...
Fig. 1: (a) Extract of file memb.h defining a template macro MEMB, and (b) its usage
(in file demo.c) to prepare allocation of up to 2 blocks of type struct point
3 Verification of memb with FRAMA-C
3.1 FRAMA-C Platform and its Deductive Verification Plugin WP
FRAMA-C [4] is a popular software analysis platform for C programs that offers var-
ious static and dynamic analyzers as individual plugins. They include the deductive
verification tool WP, abstract interpretation based value analysis, dependency and im-
pact analysis, program slicing, test generation, runtime verification, and many others.
FRAMA-C comes with a behavioral specification language ACSL [1]. The user speci-
fies the desired properties of their program by adding ACSL annotations (preconditions,
postconditions, loop invariants, assertions, etc.). These annotations are written in spe-
cial comments /*@ <annotation>*/ or //@ <annotation>. FRAMA-C/WP
can be used then to establish a rigorous mathematical proof that the program satisfies
its specification. Technically, it relies on automatic provers (SMT solvers) that try to
prove the theorems (verification conditions, or VCs) automatically generated by WP.
3.2 Declaration of Memory Allocation Data via a Pseudo-Template
A memb store is represented by the struct memb structure (see Fig. 1a, lines 2–7).
Being written in C, it does not allow polymorphism. Instead, it stores as a field of the
structure the size of the block type it is meant to store, which enables the implementation
to dynamically compute the addresses of the blocks.
The actual blocks are stored in an array (referred to as field mem), statically allocated
using a global array definition. This is illustrated in Fig. 1b, lines 10–14, for 2 blocks
of type struct point. Since its length varies, the array cannot be declared directly
in the structure, that is why the structure contains a pointer that is initialized to point to
the global array. The count array is allocated in the same fashion.
All the fields of the memb structure are initialized at compile-time and shall not
change when the program executes. That is conveniently realized using the MEMBmacro
(whose definition is omitted in Fig. 1a), which relies on the preprocessor in order to
– generate the global array definitions for the count and mem arrays,
– declare an initialized memb store.




4 assigns m→count[0 .. (m→num - 1)];
5 behavior free_found:
6 assumes ∃ Z i; 0 ≤ i < m→num ∧ m→count[i] == 0;
7 ensures ∃ Z i; 0 ≤ i < m→num ∧ \old(m→count[i]) == 0 ∧ m→count[i] == 1 ∧
8 \result == (char*) m→mem + (i * m→size) ∧
9 ∀ Z j; (0 ≤ j < i ∨ i < j < m→num) =⇒ m→count[j] == \old(m→count[j]);
10 ensures \valid((char*) \result + (0 .. (m→size - 1)));
11 ensures _memb_numfree(m) == \old(_memb_numfree(m)) - 1;
12 behavior full:
13 assumes ∀ Z i; 0 ≤ i < m→num =⇒ m→count[i] 6= 0;
14 ensures ∀ Z i; 0 ≤ i < m→num =⇒ m→count[i] == \old(m→count[i]);




19 void *memb_alloc(struct memb *m);
Fig. 2: (Simplified) ACSL contract for allocation function memb_alloc (file memb.h)
3.3 Specifying Operations
First, we specify the functions of memb in ACSL. Let us describe here the contract
for the allocation function memb_alloc shown in Fig. 2. Its ACSL contract contains
preconditions (requires clauses) that are assumed to be ensured by the caller, and
postconditions (ensures clauses) that should be ensured by the function at the end
of its execution and thus proved by the verification tool. Lines 2–3 specify that the
store respects a global validity property before and after the call. A specific behavior
can be expressed in ACSL using a behavior section, which defines additional post-
conditions whenever the behavior guard given in the assumes clause is satisfied. The
contract may stipulate that the given behaviors are disjoint and complete (lines 16-17),
the verification tool verifies it as well. The memb_alloc function has two behaviors:
1. If the memb store is full, then it is left intact, and NULL is returned (lines 12–15).
2. If the memb store has at least one free block, then it must be guaranteed that:
– the returned block is properly aligned in the block array (line 8),
– the returned block was marked as free, and is now marked as allocated (line 7),
– the returned block is valid, i.e. points to a valid memory space of a block size
that can be safely read or written to (line 10),
– the states of the other blocks have not changed (line 9),
– the number of free blocks is decremented (line 11, see also Sec. 3.4).
3.4 Keeping Track of Free Blocks
When allocating, we may need to ensure the memb store is not full, that is, some blocks
are available. To this end, we make assumptions on their number that we compute using
a logic function named _memb_numfree. For instance, requiring that at least n blocks
are free ensures that the n subsequent allocations will succeed. The specification states
that the number of free blocks is decremented when allocating, and incremented back
when a block is freed. Allocation succeeds if and only if the number of free blocks
before the allocation is non-zero.
515 ...
16 /* file demo.c, continued */
17 /*@
18 requires valid_memb(&pblock) ∧ pblock.num == 2;
19 requires pblock.size == sizeof(struct point);
20 */
21 void main() { // all contracts proven with WP except out-of-bounds pointer line 28
22 memb_init(&pblock);
23 /*@ assert _memb_numfree(&pblock) == 2; */
24 void *obj1 = memb_alloc(&pblock), *obj2 = memb_alloc(&pblock);
25 /*@ assert _memb_numfree(&pblock) == 0 ∧ obj1 6= NULL ∧ obj2 6= NULL; */
26 /*@ assert \valid((char*) obj1 + (0 .. sizeof(struct point)-1)); */
27 /*@ assert \valid((char*) obj2 + (0 .. sizeof(struct point)-1)); */
28 /*@ assert \valid((char*) obj1 + sizeof(struct point)); */ // UNPROVEN - invalid
29 memb_free(&pblock, obj1); memb_free(&pblock, obj2);
30 /*@ assert _memb_numfree(&pblock) == 2; */
31 }
Fig. 3: Example of ACSL-annotated function using memb (file demo.c)
A memb store uses its count array to determine whether its ith block is free
(count[i] = 0) or allocated (count[i] = 1). In the logic world of ACSL, counting
the number of free blocks, or more precisely counting the number of occurrences of 0
in the count array, requires an inductive definition using sub-arrays:
– If to ≤ from, then count[from . . . to[ obviously contains no zeros.
– If from > to and count[to − 1] = 0 then count[from . . . to[ contains one more
zero than count[from . . . to− 1[.
– If from > to and count[to − 1] 6= 0 then count[from . . . to[ contains as many
zeros as count[from . . . to− 1[.
In our specification, we use a more general inductive definition from [2], as well as a
few auxiliary lemmas proven by induction in the proof assistant Coq (v.8.4pl6).
3.5 Deductive Verification Results
The current specifications of the memb modules are fully proven automatically using
FRAMA-C/WP Magnesium-20151002, Alt-Ergo 0.99.1, CVC4 1.4 and Z3 4.4.2. The
ACSL specification of memb is 115 lines of code long, for a total of 259 lines in the
header file. To prove it, 32 additional lines of annotations were required in the imple-
mentation file, summing up to 154 lines. 126 verification conditions are generated.
Fig. 3 shows an annotated function using memb that can be automatically proven
with FRAMA-C/WP, except for line 28 that contains an out-of-bounds pointer. Thus,
out-of-bounds accesses are automatically detected thanks to the provided specification.
This verification case study also allowed to detect a potentially harmful situation.
The memb_free function used to decrement the count associated to the given block,
instead of setting it to 0. An awkward consequence of this is that calling memb_free
on a block with an unusual count (e.g. greater than 2) would not actually free it.
While this should not happen under normal circumstances, we have decided to replace
that decrement operation by a set to 0. This choice makes memb_free both simpler
and more robust, easing the verification process, and we recommend to integrate it into
the production code.
64 Conclusion and Future Work
IoT software is becoming more critical and widely used. We argue that formal verifi-
cation should be more systematically applied in this domain to guarantee that critical
software meets the expected level of safety and security.
This paper reports on a case study where deductive verification with FRAMA-C/WP
has been applied on the memory allocation module memb, one of the most critical
and largely used components of the Contiki OS. We have described the verification
methodology and results. In particular, the presented verification formally guarantees
the absence of out-of-bounds accesses to the block array in the memb module.
We have emphasized two technical aspects. One is related to pointer arithmetics
and casts due to the generic implementation of the module for all possible block types.
The second one concerns inductive definitions and proofs necessary to count elements
in the block status array and to state some properties on the corresponding counting
functions. While these aspects could constitute an obstacle for formal verification of
real-life C software a few years ago, they can be successfully treated today by modern
verification tools like FRAMA-C/WP. This experience report also shows that automatic
theorem provers have made significant progress, and that interactive proof, e.g. with
Coq proof assistant, can be used in complement on remaining properties that are too
complex to be proven automatically.
One future work direction is the verification of memb with a slightly more precise
specification, including for example stronger isolation properties between blocks of the
same store. This would require a better support of ACSL allocation primitives in WP
(such as the frees clause) in order to better trace validity of individual blocks. Sec-
ondly, the results of this case study should facilitate the verification of other components
of Contiki relying on memb. For some of them (such as list, defining chained lists),
this could require further extensions of FRAMA-C and ACSL. Finally, specification and
proof of other IoT software modules is another future work direction.
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